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THE 



Hawaiian Problem 



W ITU 



\\\ :\\)\)c\\d\\ oil Cuba liiul t\u 
Suoar Trust. 



A R I. S TRHF VFR 



THE 



Hawaiian Problem 



WITH 



An Appendix on Cuba and the 
Sugar Trust. 



BY 

CARL STROEVER, 

of the Chicago Bar. 



CHICAGO, 1S98. 

COZZENS & BEATON, 

PUBLISHERS. 

.4 



.v 



move heaven and earth for annexation. A stake of 4 1-2, 
and, with increased production and a higher duty, perhaps 
8, milHon dollars a year explains much of the newspaper 
enthusiasm and much of the political fervor for absolute 
annexation of Hawaii to the United States as an integral 
part thereof. A mere protectorate, you know, would not 
secure free trade in sugar. 

For Hawaii all sorts of troubles are threatening by rea- 
son of the miscellaneous character of the population with 
which regard for profits has peopled the Islands. It un- 
doubtedly would be to the advantage of the big plantation 
corporations in particular (40 of them owned even in 1893 
property worth 28 million dollars) to have these people 
kept in order by the United States at the expense of the 
general government, the revenues of which are not raised 
from Hawaii alone. 

A further advantage would accrue to the Hawaiians, and 
again to the land-holding corporations in particular, if the 
United States would assume the Hawaiian debt. True that 
the United States are to have in consideration thereof the 
ownership of all the public property in Hawaii. But accord- 
ing to the treaty all revenue and proceeds of that property 
are to be applied for the benefit of the Islanders. 

Hawaii, it may be said, would becomxc responsible for the 
debt of the United States; therefore the United States ought 
to assume the debt of Hawaii. If annexation would in- 
crease the revenue of the United States correspondingly, 
this argument might be sound. But, as pointed out above, 
the United States would lose by annexation from. 4 to 8 
million dollars annually in import-duties, which Hawaiian 
sugar ought to pay after termination of the present treaty; 
not to speak of other expenses consequent on annexation 
which the prospective revenues from Hawaii hardly would 
cover. Hawaii ought to pay her own debts, even if an- 
nexed. 

Our free trade friends likely will say that we can afiford 
to forego some revenue from sugar for the benefit of get- 
ting it cheap. This argument is based on private gain, 
often the enemy of public weal. 

Among the principal imports into Hawaii (80 per cent 

2 



thereof came from tlie United States) were in 1896 about20,- 
000 tons of grain, meat and provisions, 14,000 tons of ferti- 
lizers, 65,000 bales of hay, 23 million feet of lumber. It is 
poor economy for the United States to export materials like 
these, rich in valuable soil ingredients, and to import for 
them sugar, a material which contains little but what Is 
taken by the sugar plants from the air, and which we can 
produce in almost imlimited quantities by little more labor 
than we now employ in producing the things for which we 
get the Hawaiian sugar. 

All that makes this sugar-importation profitable is the 
saving in labor-cost effected thereby. This, for our 
nation as a whole, with hundreds of thousands of workers 
more or less idle, is of very little benefit. On the other hand 
every ton of sugar at present imported from abroad drav/s 
away more or less of the very substance of our national 
stock of wealth, with no return to speak of, constituting 
thereby the whole sugar import trade a serious drain. It is 
true that, largely in consequence of our wasteful methods 
of disposing of garbage and refuse, our big cities in particu- 
lar constitute similar drains. It is true that much of our 
other foreign trade acts as a drain on our national wealth in 
• a similar way as the sugar-trade. These facts are good rea- 
son for stopping these drains too, not for continuing the 
sugar-drain. Private desire for temporary profit is too often 
at cross-purposes with public welfare to be entrusted with 
the sole regulation of these affairs. Export-duties, prohib- 
ited by the Constitution, in many cases would be the best 
remedy. 

Consider the following table, showing Hawaiian imports 
and exports, and the percentage of trade with the United 
States, according to Mr. L. A. Thurston : 

Imports 
into Hawaii. 

1892 $4,684,207 

3893 5,346,808 

1894 5,7i3'i8i 

1895 5,714,017 

1896 7,164,561 





Per cent of 


Exports 


trade with 


from Hawaii. 


U. S. 


$ 8,060,087 


93.12 


10,818,758 


93,18 


9,140,794 


89.90 


8,474,138 


90.00 


15-515,230 


92.26 



Consider the further fact that about 99 per cent of the 
exports, practically all sugar, were to the United States, 
while only about 80 per cent of the imports came from 
there, during these years. Hawaiian sugar cost the people 
of the United vStates not only the valuable products they 
sent to Hawaii, but every year probably something like 
four to seven million dollars in cold cash besides. 

Why continue this losing business ? Why continue to 
impoverish our soil, feeding, sheltering and paying on dis- 
tant islands half-civilized competitors of our idle Vv^orking- 
men? Why not rather develop our domestic beet-sugar 
industry? An industry which would keep fertilizers, grain, 
hay, meat, timber, provisions and money at home, which 
would enormously increase the traffic of our railroads, pow- 
erfully aid numerous subsidiary industries, promote 
scientific farming, provide hundreds of thousands with 
Avell-earned comforts, and lead, as it has done everywhere 
else where it has obtained a foothold, to an enormous in- 
crease in other crops, and in general production and wealth? 
The benefits to be derived from the establishment of the 
beet-sugar industry can hardly be overestimated. The best 
testimony for that are the large export bounties provided 
by Germany, France and other European countries. The 
mere political influence of the beet-sugar interests never 
could have established or maintained these bounties. The 
governments paying them know that there are particu- 
lar merits in the beet-sugar industry not pertaining to 
other industries. They know, also, that sugar enriches the 
nation which exports it, at the cost of the nation which im- 
ports it. They are distinctly not in the business of "provid- 
ing cheap sugar for the Americans," as some of the vic- 
tims, stronger in self-esteem than in economic wisdom, 
have thought. Foreign sugar is dear at almost any price. 

To manufacture only one-half of the sugar consumed 
in the United States from domestic beets would re- 
quire the initial mvestment of about 100 million dollars in 
factories, tools, machinery, draught animals, etc. This would 
make itself felt in almost all lines of industry on account of 
the great diversity of the materials required, and there would 
be no abatement of the stimulus afterwards because the 

4 



beet-sugar industry, more than most other industries, needs 
constant renewals and improvements and because about 60 
milHon dollars would annually be spent by the factories thus 
established. Agriculturally this industry is even more im- 
portant than industrially, because it pays for a deep and 
thorough cultivation of the soil, practically enforces scien- 
tific and careful management, and tends, with such man- 
agement, to enrich the land. It is a common thing that a 
sugar-beet farmer who in rotation plants, say, one-fifth of 
his arable land in sugar beets, soon raises on the balance of 
his land an amount of produce far in excess of what he 
raised before on the whole land: his valuable sugar-beet 
crop giving him in itself a handsome profit besides : ail this 
without any additional work or expense except what the 
sugar-beet crop pays for. This I say from personal experi- 
ence derived from the management of large German farms. 

The beet-sugar industry requires the co-operation of high 
intelligence in the management, of large capital, and of the 
self-denying application to strict business of large numbers 
of independent farmers to give best results. It takes time 
and initial sacrifices to develop this co-operation. For this 
reason an infant beet-sugar industry requires, more than 
most other industries, protection and a measure of artificial 
support for a number of years: especially where, as in tht 
United States, it has to battle against a monopoly. But 
though protection against foreign competition may entail 
at first some sacrifices, through a temporarily higher price 
of sugar, yet wt may be sure that such an initial sacrifice 
will soon bring richest reward. The price of sugar will 
come down very soon to its former level again, through 
competition, engendered by the exceptionally favorable 
natural conditions for beet-sugar growing in the United 
States, and through the fall, below the present level, of sugar 
prices abroad, in consequence of the larger amount of for- 
eign sugars available for the foreign markets by reason of 
their partial or total expulsion from the markets of the 
United States. 

These results will not be attained, however, as long as we 
dilly-dally with Hawaiian, and perhaps even Cuban, annex- 
ation, and as long as we fail, as a nation, to set our face 

5 



firmly, not only against free trade in sugar, but also against 
any reciprocity treaty which provides for a lowering of the 
present duty on sugar. 

The claim is made by Secretary Wilson that Hawaiian 
competition is not detrimental to the beet-sugar industry 
because the imports from Hawaii have amounted to only 
about lo per cent, on an average, of the total sugar imports 
into the United States during the last seven years. This 
claim is unfounded. In 1896 Hawaii almost doubled her 
output as compared with that of 1895, and President Dole 
himself is reported as having said that it might be further 
increased. Hawaii probably is able to produce 20 per cent 
of all the sugar needed by the United States. But no 
matter whether Hawaii is able to increase her produc- 
tion of sugar or not, every ton produced there, and imported 
free, acts as a check on the American beet-sugar industry. 
Besides, on general principles, elucidated above,we ought to 
produce all the sugar we need, in the United States. To do 
so would, in addition, most powerfully aid in the removal 
of the present depression. 

A good deal is made, by some, of the possibilities of Ha- 
waii as a coffee-producing country. Just why these possi- 
bilities, if they really exist, should make annexation of Ha- 
waii desirable, none of these statesmen has pointed out. Is 
it in order that the United States may be able to boast of 
their manifold production? Such an idea would be silly. 
Is it that the United States may have greater revenues? 
These could with more certainty be secured without annex- 
ation by imposing a tariff on coffee. 

Perhaps these coffee-theorists mean to appeal to the 
notion that the United States ought to annex Hawaii 
because the country is rich and beautiful. That argu- 
ment would be all right from the standpoint of Roman 
or rnedieval statesmanship. In those days countries were 
annexed with a view to the riches and pleasures which could 
be squeezed out of them by the dominant power. The 
United States would degrade themselves, and betray 
their most sacred principles, by acting upon those 
lines. In fact, nothing of the kind is contemplated. The 
argument of the beauty and wealth of Hawaii without doubt 

6 



strongly appeals, in the case of many, to their mere instinct- 
ive desire for possession. Such oiight to consult 
their reason. Hawaii is pretty Well taken up by 
people who would own their possessions after annexa- 
tion as well as now^ What the United States would 
own there (aside of the fortifications, etc., which have noth- 
ing to do with the beauty and wealth of Hawaii) they would 
own under the treaty for the benefit of the Hawaiians. The 
economic effect of the riches of an annexed Hawaii on the 
people of the United States would be far from favorable. 
Its beauties are accessible now, and would be under a pro- 
tectorate. 

Great as the economic drawbacks of annexation would be, 
they would be surpassed by its ethnical and political disad- 
vantages. 

Given fair natural conditions for development, the fate 
and happiness of a nation, as wdl as of a family, depend 
chiefly on the inborn qualities of its men and women. Every 
addition to the human stock of a nation which is below the 
average in valuable qualities, or which consists of elements 
the union of which with such stock produces undesirable 
results, seriously tends to deteriorate the nation and to re- 
duce its chances for happiness and for usefulness to the 
human race. Particularly should it be shunned by a nation 
which is strong enough in numbers, and in possession of 
sufftcient natural resources, to be able to provide for all its 
needs and to hold its ground against all foreign enemies. 

The Hawaiian Islands are dominated, and three-fourths 
of them (in value) are owned by Americans; the English 
language is the ruling language, and the public laws and 
institutions are mainly formed after the American pattern. 
So at least Mr. L. A. Thurston asserts. Nevertheless the 
population is not American, and would be a most undesira- 
ble addition to any body politic whose principal elements 
are Teutonic. Only 3,000 out of a total of nearly 109,000 
are Americans; the balance was composed in 1896 about as 
follows : 



3i,ooo Natives, 2,200 British, 

24,400 Japanese, ^ 2,000 Germans, French and 
21,600 Chinese, Norwegians, 

15,100 Portuguese, 1,000 All others. 

8,400 Half-breeds. 



5,200 

100,500 3,000 Americans. 



8,200 

All those in the left-hand column belong to races the 
intermingling of which with Teutonic elements never has 
produced, and likely never will produce, desirable results. 
By tradition, by education and by inborn race qualities and 
tendencies they are wedded to, and destined for, a civiliza- 
tion wddely different from the Teutonic, and especially the 
best American, civilization, in matters political and social 
as well as in matters religious and moral. Only the 8,200 
in the right-hand column would constitute a desirable ac- 
cretion to the constituent elements of the population of the 
United States. 

It is all very w^ell to talk about the equal rights of men, 
their equality before the Creator, and the American princi- 
ple not to draw distinctions on the ground of race, color or 
religion; but it would be downright foolishness to disregard 
the truth that a certain degree of affinity in the population 
of every commonwealth is required to make it strong and 
durable, and able to exist and act without spending all its 
life-forces in overcoming internal friction. 

A few individuals from discordant races may be taken in 
by a nation without danger. Thickly settled and race-proud 
England can afiford to give the freedom of her shores to all 
the world, Chinese and negroes included. They do not 
<:ome in numbers large enough to produce efifects. The 
position of the United States is entirely different. Ele- 
ments which cannot be expected to become active, spon- 
taneous supporters of their dominant, Teutonic civilization, 
ought to be kept out. There are too many of them already. 
Their inborn race-traits do not favor development on the 
lines of Teutonic civilization. Their tendencies, capacities, 
ideals and emotions separate them farther from the Teu- 

8 



tonic people of the United States than ocean and national 
divisions separate the latter from their brethren in Europe. 
Individual examples of a congenial, high development in 
these strange elements must not be made too much of. They 
show what some individuals of a race are capable of, not 
what that race can do, or tends to. Their progeny usuaih' 
shows again the traits of the race. Education may elevate 
men and races, but it cannot overcome race character. 
Training cannot make a racer out of a heavy draft-horse, or 
convert a bulldog into a pointer. 

The mixing of races by intermarriage merely would ag- 
gravate matters. The enthusiast who, in his desire to see 
all mankind "one fold," would have us overstep the lines of 
segregation drawn by God himself and by nature, simpb/ 
invites disaster. Here and there we find individuals with 
the blood of several widely different races in their veins 
who have proceeded to greatness, but where is the nation 
in which discordant and widely different races mingled and 
which yet became great? It is in vain to point to Greece, 
Rome, France, England, Prussia and the United States as 
examples of such nations. They were, and are, great 
only in so far as made up of elements not separated 
by a v/ide gulf. They have been advanced by mixture of 
different nationalities, of parts of the same race, or at best 
by mixture of closely related races without very deep-reach- 
ing characteristics to divide them ; not by mixture of widely 
differing races. Study Rome when tottering to her 
fall; study the history of southern Europe, ot Sicily 
and Turkey in particular; observe the effects of the min- 
gling of discordant elements in northern Africa, in Central 
and South America, and in our own magnificent South, and 
be convinced that mankind was made to be "one fold." 
united in mutual regard and good will, but destined to 
reach its highest development while separated, locally and 
politically, into many divisions, according to the lines en- 
graved by nature into their bodily constitution and mental 
makeup. Local and political intermingling of widely differ- 
ent and discordant populations ever has led, and ever will 
lead, first to despotic goverment, and later on to intermar- 
riage, and to degeneration of. usually, both elements. Notii- 

9 



ino^ is of more absolutely vital importance for the wh^it 
future of the United States than to avoid further steps in 
this direction. 

It is of little moment in this matter that Americans now 
dominate Hawaii, and have succeeded in establishing a 
fairly good government. The United States, as a republic, 
are particularly dependent on the average quality of their 
people. As long as Hawaii has a population like the pres- 
ent one, her incorporation into the United States as an in- 
tegral part thereof ought not to be even thought of. 

The establishment of Hawaii as a territory would burden 
our already overburdened Congress w4th a kind of legisla- 
tion for which it is not well fitted, and would make the 
Hawaiian people unduly dependent in their domestic afifairs 
on a distant power which cannot have that understanding 
of local conditions which is necessary for proper law 
making. 

Again : Shall the local afifairs of Hawaii as a territory be 
run by appointees from Washington? Why should we 
undertake that task ? Shall they be run by a local govern- 
ment under the supervision of Congress? Why burden 
Congress w4th a task for which it is not fit? Shall the local 
government be an oligarchy? How could that be sanc- 
tioned in a territory, an integral part of the United States ? 
Shall w^e decree universal suffrage? How could we, with 
the population Hawaii has now? The less we have to do 
with the whole matter, the better. 

The very name of ''territory" would produce a continual 
clamor for equal rights with the present and former terri- 
tories of the United States, and for admission to Statehood. 
Incorporation of Hawaii as an integral part of the United 
States, and as a territory, aims chiefly at free trade in sugar. 
This the treaty makes doubly sure by its provision for the 
extension of the United States custom laws and regulations 
to the Islands. Hawaii once incorporated under the pro- 
posed treaty her status as to free trade, and in many other 
respects, would be unalterably fixed in a way contrary to the 
best interests of the United States. This is the objection 
against the plans of those who say, ''Let us annex Hawaii 
first, and attend to these other matters afterwards." 

lO 



What, then, ought to be done? 

The following are all the interests which the United States 
have in Hawaii : 

1. The Islands are of immense importance as a strategi- 
cal point, and as the only point of supply for vessels within 
a radius of 2,000 miles. They are situated on the important 
routes between Xorth America and Australia, and between 
the American isthmus and Asia. They can easily be con- 
verted into a naval stronghold, and would be a convenient 
basis for naval operations against the Pacific trade of Xorth 
America. The United States, therefore, ought to have mil- 
itary control of their principal harbors and prevent other 
nations from acquiring any power in or over the Islands, 
especially in view of the development of Australia, and of 
the prospective completion of the Nicaragua and Panama 
canals. 

The opening up of western Asia also will vastly increase 
the importance of Hawaii in the near future, but points to 
no interest of the United States which could not be sub- 
served by military control of the Islands just as well as by 
annexation. 

2. The Hawaiian race is dying out. The United States 
are very much interested in having a country of such stra- 
tegical importance and such resources as the Hawaiian 
Islands controlled and inhabited by men and women who 
not only imitate the people of the United States, but who 
are cuso as nearly as possible of the same stock, and the 
same innate ideals and impulses, as the great majority of 
the American people. By such a population only can the 
Islands be developed into such a support of the United 
States as they are capable of being. 

3. The Hawaiian trade is very largely in the hands of 
Americans and is in certain respects valuable. American 
vessels are largely employed in the trade with the Islands. 
American citizens have large and valuable property rights 
there. All these interests (though they ought not to be 
pampered at the cost of giving to Hawaii economic advan- 
tages which belong only to integral parts of the United 
States, or at the cost of deteriorating the stock of the pop- 
ulation of the United States) ought to be properly protected 

II 



and fostered as far as a sound national policy will permits 

Annexation is objectionable and not necessarg for the pro • 
tection of these interests. That vne must annex under the pro- 
posed treaty or lose control of Haioaii for ever is a mistake. 
■ The speedy establishment of a relation akin to a protectorate^ 
less promotive than annexation of private schemes at public 
expense^ will serve our true interests incomparably better. 

As an objection against a protectorate it is urged that 
it would impose "responsibility without control." Well may 
we ask: What "responsibility" which the United States 
ought to shun? and why "without control?" 

Secretary Sherman in his report says: "Any attempt to 
counteract this (i. e., the disadvantages of a protectorate) 
by * * "^ "^ a measure of suzerain control would be a 
retrograde movement toward a feudal or colonial establish- 
ment alike inexpedient and incompatible with our national 
policy." The very fact that nothing is brought forward 
against a modified protectorate over the Islands, but 
phrases like these, points to it as something deserving con- 
sideration. 

Mr. Sherman presumably believes in the Monroe doc- 
trine. What else does that doctrine amount to but to the 
application of the idea that the United States must exercise 
a certain amount of suzerain control over all of America? 
Why then be so particular in this respect about the Ha- 
waiian Islands? The fact is that the United States for a 
long time iiave claimed, and still claim, "a measure of 
suzerain control" over the Islands, by giving warning to the 
rest of the powers to keep their hands ofif, even though this 
be contrary to the desires of the Hawaiians themselves. 

It is altogether likely that the United States, in order ta 
be able to uphold the Monroe doctrine, to protect weak 
members of the American system, and to protect their own 
trade, will have to insist on exercising some sort of actual 
control not only over Hawaii, but also over other parts of 
the territory now composing the American system outside 
of the United States. This control may later on be ceded 
to a general American federation, or some combination of 
that kind, but in the meantime the United States will have 
to do the best they can without that. Any territory thus 

12 



to be controlled must, according to Mr. Sherman, be made 
an integral part of the United States. Why? 

A resolute, flexible policy, capable of adapting itself to 
all conditions or of breaking through them witJi youthful 
vigor, is what behooves the United States, and not a policy 
which deems it necessary to follow the beaten paths of out 
"national policy" where they lead to undesirable conse- 
quences. In reality there is no such "national policy" as 
Mr. Sherman alludes to. It certainly would be no more 
against our established ''national policy" to exercise some 
measure of suzerain control upon occasion than to annex 
islands separated by 2,000 miles of ocean from our shores. 

The following arrangement, or one similar to it, would 
avoid the disadvantages of annexation, and yet suitably pro- 
tect the interests of the United States : 

1. Let the United States, if possible and expedient, by 
treaty with the present government of the Islands, if not, 
then without a treaty, by reason of the established interests 
of their citizens in the Islands, and by reason of the political 
necessity for the United States of controlling the Islands, 
take sovereign control of them, and establish them as a 
"Colony of the United States," with the distinct under- 
standing that a ''Colony" is not a part of the United States 
in any sense. 

2. Let the United States take charge of the ports, the 
light-houses, the collection of the customs and the super- 
vision of immigration, and regulate these matters, and in 
particular the immigration into the country, by special laws, 
if necessary. 

3. Let the principal harbors be suitably fortified and at 
least one of them be converted into a United States reser- 
vation and strong maritime station; all fortifications to be 
in charge of the United States navy, to have under their 
guns all the larger stores of coal on the Islands, to be well 
provided with munitions of war, repairing facilities and 
docks, and to be connected by government cable with each 
other and with California. 

4. Let at least once a year a L^nited States commissioner, 
clothed with summary powers, hold court on the principal 
Islands, to hear and decide complaints against United 

13 



States officials and such others matters as may be deemed 
fit; ample safeguards to be provided for free access to this 
court by all. 

5. Lefthe customs collected be applied as follows: 

a. Pay first the cost of collections, the light-house serv- 
ice, the cost of harbor improvements made for mercantile 
purposes, and the cost of the administration of the immi- 
gration laws. 

b. Pay next any just demands of the United States and 
of foreign powers against the Hawaiian Government. 

c. Turn the balance over to the Hawaiian Government. 
In case the customs levied by the Hawaiian Government 

are not sufficient to pay the items under a. and b., let the 
United States levy additional customs; otherwise the United 
States to have merely the collection of the customs, together 
with the enforcement of the immigration laws. 

6. Let the Hawaiian minister in Washington have the 
right to address both houses of Congress in Hawaiian 
matters. 

7. Let the Constitution and general laws of the United 
Stats not extend to the Islands, except in United State? 
reservations, and in so far as may be specially provided by 
Congress in the regulation of the ports, custom service, etc. 

8. Let in all other respects the Hawaiians control their 
affairs themselves, even to the extent of negotiating with 
the L^nited States government and with foreign powers re- 
garding commercial and similar matters; the only restric- 
tions being that the United States will, if necessary, 

a. Enforce order, and uphold the Hawaiian Govern- 
ment in the legitimate exercise of authority, at the cost ot 
Hawaii ; 

b. Take care of any serious difficulty with a foreign 
government, and use their power and their control of the 
customs as a means of doing justice in disputes in which 
Hawaii may become involved. 

9. Let all cost of coast fortification and naval warfare 
be paid by the United States, all cost of land warfare be 
borne by Plawaii. 

The eventual forcing upon Hawaii of an arrangement 
like this, so far from being immoral or criminal, would be 

14 



an act of \\ise statesmanship, doing real, though perhaps 
not formal, justice to all as far as possible. The re- 
sponsibilities of an extraordinary proceeding, of course, 
always are grave, and no cause but a thoroughly just one, 
together with the impossibility of doing the proper thing 
by ordinary means, can justify it. But affairs in Hawaii 
have come to such a pass that even a treaty would have to 
be made v/ith usurpers; a ratification by the Hawaiian peo- 
ple would be a mere farce. The present masters of Hawaii, 
when they became usurpers, may have done the best that 
could be done in a difficult situation. But they least of all 
can blame the United States if these proceed on the same 
principles. Altogether the situation is such that energetic 
action by the United States on lines of broad statesmen - 
ship, without much consideration for formalities, eventu- 
ally would seem proper and justified. Such action though 
probably it would bring forth a great outcry from adversely 
interested private parties, and from a number of one-sided 
theorists, would soon gain the hearty endorsement of the 
great mass of the people of the United States, and would 
vastly increase their prestige abroad. 

An arrangement like that proposed might be supple- 
mented by an agreement between the United States and 
Hawaii concerning trade relations and other matters. 

Should the above suggestions be carried out, the Hawai- 
ian problem, as far as the United States are concerned, 
would be solved. The fallacy would be disposed of that v/e 
must annex Hawaii under the proposed treaty if we wish to 
prevent annexation by England or Japan. A modified pro- 
tectorate would be established giving full control with little 
responsibility. Hawaiian competition in the United States 
sugar-market would be weakened, the Hawaiian drain 
on our national wealth in part stopped. The military 
and other advantages of annexation would be secured with- 
out the damage to the beet-sugar industry, and without the 
other disadvantages, economic, political and ethnical, which 
would result from the consummation of the proposed treaty. 
In fact all the interests of the United States would be sub- 
served, as far as seems possible. 

This further advantas^e would accrue, that the Hawaiian 



plantation owners, aware of the determination of the United 
States not to extend further privileges to Hawaii until her 
population should be an American one, would be directly 
interested in discarding Chinese, Japanese and other objec- 
tionable laborers, and substituting such as would make de- 
sirable American citizens, since by these means they would 
promote full annexation with all its advantages to them. 
With immediate annexation the tendency would be in the 
other direction. All the commercial advantages of com- 
plete union being secured, the selfish interest of the planta- 
tion owners would be on the side of cheap labor, and the 
chances would be strong that an undesirable supply oi 
it would find its way into the Islands, all laws and regula- 
tions of Congress notwithstanding. 

To the Hawaiians the proposed arrangement, though it 
Vv^ould not secure to them the undue advantages promised 
by the proposed treaty, would give and secure: 

1. Protection against Asiatic domination. 

2. Protection against foreign aggression and against 
domination by powers less identified in interest with them 
than the United States. 

3. Favorable consideration and treatment by, and close 
political connection with, their commercially and politically 
most important neighbor. 

4. Practically complete home-rule, with protection 
against disorder. 

It remains to consider a number of objections which are 
likely to be raised against the proposed arrangement. 

The climate of Hawaii is believed by some to be unsuited 
for the performance of out-door work by our race. If this 
Vv'ere so, it might still be proper for the United States, upon 
political considerations, to prevent the peopling of the Is- 
lands by Asiatics, and for that purpose to take control of 
the immigration into them. Were the population of the 
Islands a matter of indifference to the United States, or 
were they already filled with a certain population which 
could not be removed, L should recommend an arrange- 
m.ent differing from that proposed by me in this : 

a. Let the United States not meddle with the immigra- 
tion at all. 

16 



b. ]^et them take charge of ports, Hght-houses, etc., in 
tlie case of a few of the principal harbors only. 

'c. Let the customs ordinarily be collected by the Ha- 
waiian Government. In case, however, any damages have 
to be collected for the United States or for a foreign power, 
and the Hawaiian Government refuses to pay, then the 
United States might temporarily take charge of the collec- 
tion of the customs, in one or two of the principal harbors 
only. 

Thus modified, the proposed arrangement might also be 
suitable for the establishment of a Colony of the United 
States in the West Indies or in Central America, if any 
such ever should become necessary. 

But the Haw^aiian climate hardly is unsuited for the per- 
formance of outdoor labor by our race. All accounts say 
that it is remarkably salubrious, and free from excessive 
heat. Our race has shown great power of adjustment; a 
clim?.te which is suitable for the Portuguese would seem to 
interpose no insurmountable obstacles to a stock that 
thrives in the much hotter climates of eastern Texas and 
of the great valley of California. Our race may not be 
able to work as vigorously, especially during the noon 
hours and in the lowdands, as others in that climate, but the 
country is so rich that a large population can sustain itself 
in comfort without very hard work. 

It is said that the United States have no surplus popula- 
tion to send to Hawaii; that they need all their desirable 
elements within their own borders. This is true as far as 
it goes. But Hawaii is a small country, and a large part of 
it is barren; it would not take very many families to replace 
the Asiatics now there, and to provide for a suf^cient in- 
crease to take the place of the vanishing natives. The 
United States have great reservoirs, in the power for in- 
crease of their own white people, and in the population of 
northwestern Europe, to draw" upon for desirable stock. If 
the United States would only stop the undesirable- supply 
and unrestricted competition of cheap labor from other 
sources, a supply and competition which tend to lower tlie 
standard of living and of wages below what it ought to be 
in every decent community, they could have a practically 

17 



unlimited supply of first-class stock from those two sources. 

Again, it may be objected that an arrangement like that 
proposed for Hawaii would be a departure from democratic 
principles, and that our administrative apparatus is not 
adapted for it, — objections partly in line with Mr. Sherman's 
argument. I concede that some unduly generalized and 
extended notions and traditions of an abstract character 
might be infringed upon by its adoption, but not further 
than they are out of harmony with actual conditions and 
possibilities. What the United States owe to themselves m 
this matter, is to apply these principles where they are 
properly applicable and beneficial. To act upon them 
where their application would be detrimental, or to stand 
idly by and see important interests of theirs go to perdition, 
simply because they cannot properly be taken care of ex- 
cept by a deviation from unduly generalized, abstract prin- 
ciples, would be sheer folly. If new conditions cannot be 
met by the application of existing political institutions and 
administrative apparatus, the necessary means must be cre- 
ated to properly meet those conditions. 

It finally may be objected4hat Hawaii strategically would 
become a weak point of the United States. 

If Hawaii is not made an integral part of the United 
States, at the worst a dependency only would be lost, and 
the United States themselves, for that matter, would be as 
well off as they are now. In arranging the terms of a peace 
the United States even w^ould get credit for such a loss. 

But such eventualities are hardly to be considered. If, 
as most of the people who now make the same argument 
against annexation, assert, the mere expression of the wish 
and will of the United States will be sufficient to prevent 
other powers from seizing the islands, then surely they 
would not try to seize a fortified Hawaii, with the harbors 
and coal supplies under United States guns, and subma- 
rine mines and other amenities of civilization lurking in un- 
known places. 

Even an enemy superior on the high seas w^ould find a 
fortified Hawaii not a very desirable point to attack, and 
one very expensive and difficult to blockade on account of 
its distance from all bases of attack, and on account of its 
accessibility from all sides. 

i8 



But then all such arguments presuppose that the United 
States cannot be, and ought not to be, the stronger power 
on the high seas in any contest which might arise with 
one of the great sea-powers of Europe. They recommend 
that the United States content themselves with a few ships, 
a navy just big enough to prevent filibustering and to pro- 
tect their interests against semi-civilized enemies. Such an 
idea is hardly in keeping either with the established policy 
of the United States and their proper political aspirations, 
or with the feeling of protection and security, and of na- 
tional self-esteem, which their citizens ought to be able to 
enjoy wherever they go. 

How shall the United States be able to uphold the Mon- 
roe doctrine, to keep other powers from seizing Haw^aii, to 
maintain a suitable policy regarding the interoceanic canals, 
to prevent other powers from shutting them out from the 
markets of Asia and Africa, and to protect a trade which 
soon ought to extend all over the world, without a navy 
equal that of any other nation? To rely upon the 
dissensions of Europe in these matters is a very 
doubtful policy. The Chinese just now are reap- 
ing the fruits of having acted, more or less, on 
the same basis of overconfidence. The United States 
can do without a large standing army, but they have 
interests without their own borderes which are growing 
more and more important, and which cannot be suitably 
protected without a very strong navy, adequate to take 
the aggressive against any one of the great powers. If we 
expect these interests to be protected by others for us, 
it will be done only at the cost of a great sacrifice, in ma- 
terial and financial regard as well as in self-respect and in 
libertv of acting according to our own conscience and for 
the best interests of the nation and of mankind. 

A strong navy by no means would be a mere source 
of expense, and a dead w-eight on the nation, as some would 
have it. Quite the contrary. 

It would give the necessary backbone to a national policy 
which might make itself felt in the affairs of this hemi- 
sphere and even beyond its borders, for good. That it would 
be used to any extent for reckless conquest, for intimida- 

19 



tion and for wanton quarrels is hardly likely, as long as the 
]3eople of the United States are opposed to such things. 
Properly developed and used, not for bulldozing or subjuga- 
tion, but for the upholding of right and justice, and for the 
defense of liberty and fair play, such a navy would be a 
most powerful factor in the advancement of American ship 
building, and of the trade of the United States with foreign 
countries. Itwould turn the eyes of millions towards the high 
seas; it would inspire with a sense of superior safety and 
superior self-respect Americans on foreign shores and in 
foreign lands, and it would act as a powerful stimulus to 
the efforts of many of them to make themselves and their 
doings, in business as well as in other matters, worthy of 
the flag that ruled the seas. 

National self-respect and national spirit would be effect- 
ively promoted, together with all the grand and beautiful 
virtues to which they are a source or a potent aid. These 
sentiments and virtues hardly can reach a full and sound 
development while national power and strength are as 
poorly developed as they are now in the United States. 

Last but not least, a powerful navy will give a prestige 
to the great principles for which this Republic stands, which 
never can be enjoyed by a cause, no matter how righteous, 
until it blooms forth in well sustained and ready strength. 
Just as such strength is the most conspicuous attribute of 
every sound and well developed body, by which it largely 
is, and ought to be, judged, so a political and social system 
commands respect, and its principles spread, and permeate 
the world, very largely in proportion to the strength it de- 
velops. And this strength, to be effectual in this way, 
must be actual and visible, and not merely latent ; otherwise 
it will avail comparatively little. Again: It may be for a 
church, or for a theory, to show its strength in other 
ways. A state (for this purpose the United States constitute 
one state), now and for a long time to come, has to 
show it, neither last nor least, in its power for war; and in 
this age of complicated machinery and huge organizations 
plenty of good men and plenty of resources do not consti- 
tute war-power any more than they alone would constitute 
the transporting power of our great railroad system with 

20 



all its intricate and highly artificial equipments, its compli- 
cated organization and machinery, and its specially trained 
and experienced officers, from president to switchman, who 
have got accustomed to co-operating in their respective 
places. 

As to the financial sacrifices which a great navy will 
entail, I merely want to say that a nation which is rich 
enough to spend prohably much more than 1,300 million 
dollars for stimulants and sweets alone, can afford to sup- 
port a navy, which probably would cost considerably less 
than 150 million dollars per year. The tremendous ad- 
vance of England and Germany during the last thirty years 
ought to suffice to convince us that strong military estab- 
lishments are not such a fearful economic burden as many 
suppose. With a sensible monetary and financial system 
the burden could be borne easily. Besides it might readily 
happen one of these days that much more would have to 
be spent in paying the cost of hasty preparations for w^ar 
under unfavorable conditions, or the cost of a protracted jv 
lost war, than a good navy would cost in a generation. 
War-power, to be efifective, must be available at any time. 
In this respect it is like a fire department. Modern war 
gives no more time, in comparison, for organization and 
equipment, than a big fire. Time is acknowledged by strat- 
egy, now 'more than ever, as an element secondary to no 
other in importance. We must be ready when the emer- 
gency arises; ready, too, with a force strong enough to 
meet almost any emergency. It always has been, and for a 
long time to come will be, as much a spendthrift policy for 
a nation to be stingy about her war apparatus, as it is for 
a community to be stingv about her fire department. 

Hawaii would be of little value to the United States with 
a weak navy. But if the United States want to uphold the 
Monroe doctrine, keep other powers out of Hawaii, and 
take the place in the world which they ought to take, they 
must have a strong navy anyhow, and with such, and to 
such, navy the control of Hawaii would be of enormous 
advantage. If making Hawaii a colony of the United States 
would hasten the creation of such a navy, by all means let 
Hawaii be made a colony. 

21 



If this is clone Hawaiian sugar ,might either be excluded, 
or compelled to pay from 5 to 8 million dollars duty, 
enough to pay interest on a sum with which the United 
States could convert Hawaii into one of the finest naval 
stations in the world. Annexation is a very poor bargain 
from any point of view. 

The solution of the Hawaiian problem proposed above 
is practical in all its features, and can, v/ith the exercise 
of some diplomatic skill, be put into execution, if but the 
will and firm resolution is there to do it. 

In its outlines the proposed arrangement seems to pre- 
sent a plan by which (with some modifications) not 
onl}^ the Hawaiian but also the Cuban and other similar 
questions might be solved, and by which the Monroe doc- 
trine may lead to a fuller protection of America against 
foreign aggression, and ultimately to a closer union of espe- 
cially the weaker states of the American system under the 
leadership of the United States. By the extended appli- 
cation of such a plan the United States would acquire the 
control of those places which they need for an efficient de- 
fense of the Monroe doctrine, while yet they would be able 
to preserve their character as an essentially Teutonic na- 
tion, free to follow in her social and economic development 
the own innate tendencies of her Teutonic people, without 
interference by the disintegrating influences of a motley 
citizenship. Carl Stroever. 

Ashland Block, Chicago, January, 1898. . 



22 



APPENDIX. 

(i) THE INTEREST OF THE SUGAR TRUST IN 
ANNEXATION OF HAWAII AND CUBA. 

Every first-class modern beet sugar factory does its own 
refining. It can do it cheaper than a separate refinery be- 
cause it saves the remelting and much double handling of 
sugar. The sugar-trust is based on the monopoly of refin- 
ing. It has no use for a sugar industry which does its own 
refining. It is the natural enemy of the beet-sugar industry. 

The sugar-trust, in order to be able to keep down the beet 
sugar industry, needs cheap raw-sugar from other sources. 
Hawaii and Cuba are able to furnish enormous quantities 
of it. If they remain outside of the United States the 
chances are that their product will become largely unavail- 
able to the sugar trust on account of the import-duties now 
imposed, or hereafter likely to be imposed on it. 

The sugar-trust knows that from the standpoint of na- 
tional ecoriomy the present importation of sugar is a nuis- 
ance, because it leads to a continual impoverishment of our 
soil by promoting the exportation of immense quantities 
of materials which are rich in valuable soil elements. The 
sugar-trust knows that sugar brings nothing into the coun- 
try but what we have in superabundance in our air. It 
knows that the American people in time will appreciate this, 
and conclude to exclude foreign sugar, knowing that they 
will have to pay a higher price for domestic sugar only 
temporarily, while they will benefit themselves immensely 
for all limes by stopping one of the most insidious and det- 
rimental drains upon the commonwealth. If Hawaii and 
Cuba are annexed the importation of sugar from there free 
of duty will be secured practically for all times, an effectual 
damper Vv^iil be provided for the beet-sugar-industry, and 
the sugar-trust will be fairly secure in its now seriouslv 
threatened monopoly. 

It is said that the sugar-trust opposes annexation because 
it would open the United States to the importation of re- 
fined sugar from Hawaii, this importation at present being 
practically impossible because the existing reciprocity 

23 



treaty admits, free of duty, raw sugar only. Opposition to 
annexation on this ground is hardly more than a ruse, used 
by the trust to cover its true designs. The trust, m case of 
annexation, would crush out these Hawaiian refineries, or 
take them in, and all would go on swimmingly as before. 
To crush out or to take in all the independent factories and 
refineries which thorough protection of the beet-sugar in- 
dustry would bring into existence by scores every year, 
until we would have several hundred of them, would be 
quite a different task for the trust. This task would be par- 
ticularly difficult if the sugar-schedule of the present tariff 
were changed so as to provide less protection to the trust. 
No amount of deception and newspaper taffy ought to 
make sensible people believe that the sugar trust is seriously 
fighting annexation. 

As to the Nebraska farmers who are reported to have 
endorsed annexation vmder the proposed treaty, they would 
not have done it if they had seen the true bearings of this 
question. They probably were led by the idea that annex- 
ation would make no difference as far as the beet-sugar 
interests are concerned, since Hawaiian sugar is coming in, 
under the existing reciprocity treaty, free anyhow. They 
ought to consider that this treaty can, and ought to, be 
terminated by giving one year's notice, and that thereby the 
whole unrestricted competition of Hawaiian sugar would be 
cut off. Annexation would establish this competition for- 
ever. 

To some extent the reported endorsement of annexation 
by the Nebraska farmers seems to have been caused by a 
desire to antagonize Mr. Oxnard. If this is true, it is much 
to be regretted. However much we must oppose capitalists 
when their schemes and actions are antagonistic to public 
welfare (unfortunately this is too often the case), yet we 
must not be carried away to endorsing a measure, in part 
because a capitalist opposes it. Absolutely absurd is such 
attitude if the measure in question is contrary to our own 
and to the public interest. Mr. Oxnard perhaps has taken, 
in regard to the Hawaiian question as a whole, a stand 
which I should not approve. But I feel sure that in oppos- 
ing annexation under the present treaty on behalf of the 

24 



beet-sugar industry of the United States, and in trying to 
impress Congress with the merits of this industry and the 
importance of its protection, he is doing the country a real 
service. He may, at present, lack popular support, on ac- 
count of the ignorance of the people at large on the subject. 
But the time is fast coming when the people will be enlight- 
ened on this matter. The party which will betray this in- 
dustry to foreign competitors and to the sugar-trust will 
have to sufifer for it. Congress is in a position to know the 
facts better than the people at large; it is responsible for 
doing the right thing, even though temporarily it may lack 
popular support. The fact that Mr. Oxnard's interest as a 
capitalist coincides with his interest as a citizen may detract 
from the weight of his personal plea, but cannot diminish 
the \yeight of his solid arguments and facts. For beet-sugar 
growers to endorse annexation, in part becaiise Mr. Oxnard 
opposes it, is like a man's cutting of¥ his nose to spite his 
wife. 

If, as the newspapers say, Mr. Oxnard is fighting annexa- . 
tion side by side with the sugar-trust, the quicker he lets 
go of that partner, the better for him and his cause. The 
sugar-trust won't put up an honest fight against its own true 
interest. It is simply fighting a sham-battle to deceive the 
unwary, and it is doing this nicely. An open sham-battle 
would arouse suspicion. A seemingly covered- one makes 
people think that the trust is in earnest. Of course they are 
permitted to discover that the fight is on. 

To appreciate fully the importance of Hawaii and Cuba 
in regard to the sugar supply of the United States, we 
must consider that these two countries are able to furnish at 
least 2,500, and probably much more than 3,000 million 
pounds of sugar per year, while the total consumption of 
the United States is about 4,500 million pounds per year. 
In other words, Cuba and Hawaii can furnish probably 
much more than two-thirds of all the sugar we need. They 
will do it if given the chance. But they will not do it with- 
out unduly draining the United States of much of their 
wealth. 

We may be sure that if annexation fails, a desperate ef- 
fort will be made to secure at least a long time treaty pro- 

2; 



viding- above all for admission of sugar free, or almost free, 
of duty; in the case of Cuba as well as Hawaii. Then, as 
now in regard to Hawaiian annexation, the question will 
arise: Shall the most important protection provided by the 
new tarifif bill be largely set at naught for the benefit of the 
sugar trust, already undtily favored? How can the party 
in power afford to do or permit this ? The people may not 
understand the trick now, but they will after a while. 



(2) THE INTEREST OE CUBAN LANDHOLDERS 
IN ANNEXATION. 

Cuba exported from 1892 to 1895 on an average nearly 
2,000 million pounds of sugar per year into the United 
States. Since then the Cuban war has brought about 
a reduction. 2,000 million pounds, however, may be 
taken as a low average of the amount of sugar 
Cuba is able to import into the United States every 
year. The present import duty of nearly i cent per 
pound on this quantity would amount to about 20 million 
dollars. Since Cuban sugar could probably not be sold 
outside of the United States, except for just about so much 
less as the duty would amount to, annexation and conse- 
quent free trade with the United States would mean 20 mil- 
lion dollars per year on sugar alone to the Cuban land own- 
ers. This explains in part the intense desire on the part of 
many Cubans for annexation, the efforts of the Cuban 
Junta in this direction, and much of the newspaper enthus- 
iasm for closer connection with, and ultimate annexation 
of, Cuba. A number of political orators undoubtedly draw 
spiration largely from the same source. 

Since an increase in the. duty on sugar by no means be- 
longs to the impossibilities, and since by improved methods 
of production the Cuban sugar output probably might 
largely be increased, the prospective amount at stake upon 
Cuban annexation, in sugar alone, may perhaps be nearer 
40, than 20, million dollars per year. 

Most of the extremely valuable tobacco output of Cuba 
also goes to the United States, and of course the tobacco 
growers of Cuba are likewise interested in annexation, for 
the same reason as the sugar growers. 

2.(i 



(S) THE INTEREST OF BONDHOLDERS IN AN- 
NEXATION OF CUBA. 

There are two classes of such bondholders. One class are 
the holders of probably something like 400 million dollars 
in bonds issued by Spain, and said to be specifically based 
on the revenue and resources of Cuba. 

The other class are the holders of a vast quantity of 
bonds, issued by the revolutionary government of Cuba. 

Both of these classes are eager for annexation or at least 
some form of intervention b}- the United States by which 
the payment of their bonds in some way would be guaran- 
teed. It is safe to say that syndicates in possession of these 
bonds will be, and probably have been, glad to give part of 
their holdings to men influential in United States politics, 
and able to control American news and newspapers, in order 
to secure their support and active, interested co-operation. 



In calling attention to the aforesaid interests in the an- 
nexation of Cuba and Hawaii, I ~do not wish to cast sus- 
picion on everybody who favors it; that would be foolish 
and unjust. I merely want to w^arn against the arguments 
of those who justly may be suspected of being inspired by 
those interests. 

The United States have even less interest in Cuba than 
in Hawaii. Cuba has a much larger undesirable population 
than Hawaii. She hardly ever could be peopled wdth Teu- 
tonics. Her sugar-industry is incomparably more danger- 
ous to the United States than that of Hawaii. 

The true interest of the United States requires them not 
to interfere further with Cuban affairs than 

1. To stop the wholesale murder and robbery now going 
on there; they owe that to the outraged conscience of their 
own people and of humanity; and 

2. To keep foreign powers out of Cuba, and perhaps 
to fortify and control themselves some of Cuba's strategi- 
cally most important ports. 

Any further interference with Cuban affairs almost cer- 
tainly would impose heavy burdens on, and prove detrimen- 
tal to, the United States, without subserving any vital in- 
terests of theirs, or of humanity. C. S. 

27 



INDEX. 



American interests in Hawaii 11 

Annexation, Hawaii unduly benefited 

by 1-2 

not necessary for U. S 11-1»> 

objections to 1-9 

objections to, economic 1-0 

objections to, political 6-10 

objections to, ethnical G-') 

Asia, importance of Hawaii in ref- 
erence to 11 

Australia, importance of Hawaii in 

reference to 11 

Beauty of Hawaii, no reason for aji- 

nexation 6-7 

Beet-sugar industry, merits of 4-(> 

necessity for protection of 5-6 

sacrifices for it temporary 5 

enemy of sugar trust 23-24 

annexation detrimental to 5-6 

Bondholders, interests of Cuban 27 

Cable, government, to Hawaii 13 

Chinese immigration 8-13-16 

Climate, Hawaiian 16-17 

Coffee industry in Hawaii 5 

Coal supplies, control of 13 

Colonies of the United States... .13-17-22 

Colony, establishment of Hawaii' as a. 13 

advantages thereof to U. S... 15-16 

advantages there to Hawaii 16 

Control, sovereign by U. S 12-13 

Cuba, annexation of 5-23-27 

duty of U. S. as to 27 

reciprocity with 5-25 

interest of sugar-trust iu 23-26 

Customs, collection thereof iu Ha- 
waii 13-14-16-17 

Debt, payment of Hawaiian 2 

Deceptive tactics of Sugar Trust.. 1-23-25 

Democratic principles 18 

Ethnical objections to annexation. .7-10 
Export bounties, beneficial to Eiirope..4 

Exports from Hawaii 3-4 

Federation, American 12 

Force, applif-ation of 14-15 

Franchise, difficulty of regulating it 

in Hawaii 12 

Harbors in Hawaii, control of 11-13 

Immigration, desiral)le S-lV 

regulation of Hawaiian 11-13-16 

Imports into Hawaii 3-4 

Interests of U. S. in Hawaii 11 

Inteimarriage between races 9 



Junta, Cuban 26 

Japanese immigration .8-13-16 

Landholders benefitted by annexa- 
tion 1-2-26 

connected with sugar trust 1 

Lauds of Hawaii taken up 7 

to be held by U. S. for Hawai- 

ians 2-7 

Military power, benefits of 19-21 

Monroe doctrine 12-19-21 

Motley citizenship 7-10-16-22-27 

National policy 12-13-19-22 

Xavy, necessity of strong 19-21 

Nebraska farmers indorsing annexa- 
tion 24-25 

Nicaragua Canal 11 

Oligarchy in Hawaii 10-15 

Oxnard opposed to annexation 24-25 

Policy, flexible, needed for U. S 13-18 

Political objections to annexation. .. .10 
Population, inferiority of Hawaiian. .7-8 

Protectorate, objections to 12 

Race-mixture, evils of 7-10 

Reciprocity treaties 5-25 

Responsibility of protectorate 12-15 

Sherman, Secretary, his objections 

to a protectorate 12 

Soil-ingredients, A'aluable, must not 

be exported 3-4 

Strategical importance of Hawaii 11 

Sugar, evils of free-trade in 3-5 

ought to bo produced at home.3-6-23 
Sugar, output of Hawaii 1-3-25 

output of Cuba 25 

Sugar-beet growers ought to oppose 

annexation 5-24-25 

Sugar-trust, deceptive tactics of.. 1-23-25 

interested in annexation. .. .1-23-25 

opposed to beet-sugar industry.23.25 
Tariff on sugar must be upheld.5-6-25-26 
Territory, Hawaii as a 1-10 

objection to name 10 

Teutonic civilization Sr22 

Tobacco, Cuban, groAvers 26 

Trade with Hawaii a losing one 4 

Usurpation of power 15 

AVar-power, benefits of 19-21 

necessity for 19-21 

Wealth of Hawaii no reason for an- 
nexation 6-7 

Wilson, Secretary, on annexation 6 



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